Wilson's Mexican Foreign Policy

“We created this nation, not to serve ourselves, but to serve mankind,” Woodrow Wilson said. Wilson believed in America not only as the role model of the world but as the nation with the moral high ground to push other nations to adopt similar beliefs of Democracy and capitalist free markets.1 But, Wilson considered morality the primary concern of foreign policy.2 Wanting to make the decision to recognize the Huerta regime guided by morality, President Wilson’s main obstacle was Mexican Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson. America had not yet recognized the new President in Mexico and the situation was getting worse everyday. Not only were things becoming more difficult for the Mexican people but also for the Americans who lived in Mexico. The constant revolution had already caused millions of dollars of damage to American interests and the chaos was escalating. A decision was needed and so many giving advice were not interested in the long road of moral foreign policy.
“It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign Affairs,” exclaimed Woodrow Wilson.3 A History Professor before he ventured into politics he had focused his studies on national
politics. During his 1912 Presidential Campaign he had barley spoke of international affairs.4 Yet, Wilson expanded the presidential power in international politics. Maintaining the Open Door policy, he believed in economic expansion with a reformist flavor.5 Wilson and his first Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan rejected Dollar Diplomacy.6 Yet, he understood that for the US domestic markets to continue to prosper, access to foreign markets was essential. For Wilson American influence could not only uphold and teach morals in Latin America but raise the standard of living of the poor peoples.7
When he took office on March 4, 1913 the Decena Tragica had already past and Taft had left all of the mess for his successor. Wilson did not hold the Mexican people in contempt, actually criticizing the Mexican-American war as “inexcusable aggression,” on the part of the US.8 Yet, he asserted, “I am going to teach the South American Governments to elect good men.”9
If President Wilson was to teach the Mexicans about picking good leaders then he had to decide first if he would pick the new President of Mexico, General Victoriano Huerta for diplomatic recognition. Wilson
understood very little of the current situation occurring in Mexico at the time of his inauguration.10 In fact Wilson was very upset at the news of the assassination of President Madero and Vice President Suárez. The murder of an elected president was the kind of thing that “stirred Wilson’s nature.” He believed in democratic principals and was full of indignation by the atrocities that had occurred in Mexico. As a scholar the President elect felt it important to know more about the situation and was being advised in Mexican affairs as early as the end of 1912.11 He received persuasive letters from interventionists or those with material interests in Mexico. He was able to see all of the State Departments and Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson’s reports.12 The President elect developed his “profound sense of distrust,” for Ambassador Wilson by reading these reports.13
Henry Lane Wilson, Ambassador to the US in Mexico was the avant-garde of American business. He was the biggest obstacle that President Wilson had to hurdle to make his decision on recognition. Lane Wilson was an uncooperative emissary who was more interested in following his own agenda then doing his duty to the President.
Lane Wilson had returned to the Mexican Embassy in early January
1913 at the tail end of the Taft presidency. He reported that the revolution against the government had “for the moment sensibly diminished with possibilities that at any time one or more revolutionary movements, maybe more [would explode], all in a greater or less degree, dangerous to the Government which is already suffering from universal unpopularity mixed with certain elements of fear and contempt.”14 Ambassador Wilson regarded the whole situation as “gloomy if not hopeless.” This attitude was a shift to pessimism for the Ambassador, and it perplexed the state department. It so confused Secretary of State Knox that he requested an explanation from Lane Wilson.15 Lane Wilson wrote back that his reports were of factual events and he only “reported firsthand” about States that didn’t have consuls.16 He explained that all other reports were from “accredited American representatives.” He also claimed he did not over embellish, but would stop his own reporting. Secretary Knox compelled him to continue his papers but to be cautious.17 But many of the consuls’ reports were not conveying gloom and doom, yet a minority expressed an anxiety of some possible action.18 Later on January 27 Fred Dearing a Foreign Service officer attached a note to one of Lane Wilson’s telegrams, reporting that the information in Wilson’s report seemed to come directly from the morning’s paper and the vague facts could not have been verified by the Ambassador before he sent the message.19
Knox brought his suspicions to President Taft’s attention. He had three main points of question about Ambassador Wilson’s behavior. His first point was his change to a more pessimistic view of the political situation in Mexico. Knox believed it to be “unjustified” and “misleading.”20 Knox’s second point was Wilson’s biggest problem; he had taken his own opinion of the situation and was reacting from that point rather then from the view of the US Government. Knox said that Lane Wilson was criticizing State Department policy and trying to push his own agenda.21 Lastly, he points out that the Ambassador had intentions of trying to force the US’s hand in its deals with Mexico.22
As evidence against Lane Wilson, Knox used a communiqué between Washington and Mexico of January 9, 1913 in which the Ambassador spoke of a protest made by Madero against a demanding letter that had been sent from Washington on September 15 1912. In the January 9 communiqué Wilson recommended that the charges brought up the last September should be looked at “collectively not independently.” Wilson believed that the US ought to require the Madero Government to make “promises clear and specific” to satisfy all the items on the September 15th letter.23 He later gave Knox a note that basically tried to convince the Secretary to abandon the neutral policy and to force the Mexican Government instead of the current diplomatic roundabout. He Told Knox, “either the Mexican government must yield, repair the damages it has done to us and give clear guarantees for the future or we must take some vigorous and drastic action.” Lane Wilson further discusses that this action would “secure redress” for the damages done to the US, put an end to the lawlessness, and “perhaps, incidentally,” topple the Madero regime “which is hateful to a vast majority
of the people of [Mexico].”24
That letter of September 15, 1912 afore mentioned regarded a written protest by the Taft presidency that bordered on an ultimatum.25 The letter outlined three major tiffs that the Taft administration had with Mexico at that time. The complaints covered murders of Americans not being punished, hostility towards Americans not being quelled, and the speed of which Madero government’s was coming up with solutions for their problems.26 Taft demanded that improvements must be made or the US would change its foreign policy.27 This action was prompted by a message sent at the end of August 1912 by Ambassador Wilson in which he spelled out a boorish scene. Several states were under attack, the rebels were destroying villages, and killing men, women, and children.28
The State department was unable to check the reliability of these claims of terror due to the “poor political reporting of the consuls.” After a censuring of the consuls, Ambassador Wilson retorted, saying that the States hit hardest were together very vast and all were represented by only one consul.29 Knox then wondered, if it was so hard for one consul to keep track of such a big space then who were Lane Wilson’s sources. According to P. Edward Haley’s book Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917, the government found four months later that Lane Wilson was basing his descriptions of carnage on pro-American, anti-Maderist newspapers that were published in Mexico City.30
Secretary Knox continued to caution Lane Wilson, “to maintain perspective” as more and more evidence was discovered that impugned his reliability. But just two weeks after Knox brought the question of Lane Wilson’s credibility to Taft the Decena Tragica or Ten Tragic Days commenced.31 Two weeks after President Madero was assassinated President Wilson was inaugurated. Ambassador Wilson had supported immediate recognition of Huerta at the time. But, Taft yielded the decision to his successor, leaving Woodrow Wilson with an incredible Ambassador and a huge mess in Mexico.32
Keeping foreign policy as calm as possible was the best way to support capitalism. Stamping out the fires that might lead to a freer society was worth it to subscribers to Dollar Diplomacy, which couldn’t work as well with rebellions occurring.33 The Republican appointed State Department followed suit and suggested an immediate recognition of Huerta. President Wilson knew that their only goal was to assist the American Interests but he was interested in “the submerged eighty-five percent of the people,” of Mexico specifically but broadly in all Latin American Nations and the world.34 When the subject of Latin American Affairs was raised in a March 7, Cabinet meeting the president got an idea.35
President Wilson’s statement of March 12 showed his intention to support both the interests of the people Latin America and the US. Further and more importantly he moved that cooperation was possible “only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based on law.” He further states that “just government rests always upon the consent of the governed.” While this message was not addressed specifically he must have had Huerta in mind. Evidence of this is seen when he states, “We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition.” Next he warns that nations governed like this would not have stable or lasting peace with the US.36 Now President Wilson had to get closer to the problems in Mexico and find the information he needed to make his decision about recognition.
Woodrow Wilson’s suspicion of the accuracy of Lane Wilson’s Reports must have led him to choose a Special Agent to begin an independent investigation of the Status of the Huerta government. On April 19, 1913 President Wilson sent a note asking William Bayard Hale “to undertake a tour of the Central and South American states, ostensibly on your own hook, in order that unofficially and through the eyes of an independent observer we might find out just what is going on down there.” President Wilson further asked that Hale regard this proposal confidentially.
Subsequently, Hale accepted the duty. He had worked on a biography of President Wilson while he was still Governor of New Jersey, it made Wilson so popular that he adopted it as his 1912 Presidential Campaign Biography.37 Hale’s Biography of Wilson, named The New Freedom, was so much in line with Wilson’s views that the President felt that Hale could serve the administration. Yet, Hale spoke no Spanish, and displayed a sense of WASP superiority in his writings on previous travels to the Caribbean and Central America.38
Rumors followed Hale to Mexico City, that he might be investigating Ambassador Wilson. Due to his acclaimed career as a journalist had gotten him invited to speak at a local Jockey Club. In his speech he attempted to put at ease the gossip of his being a spy for the President and assured his audience that he was merely collecting info for articles.39 Hale established many contacts, but mostly Americans who could provide information in English. He maintained contact with railroad execs, oil representatives, mine operators, and numerous middle-class small business owners. Many of Hales sources were known enemies of Ambassador Wilson, like American Consul General Arnold Shanklin.40 Finally, Boaz Long the chief of Latin American Affairs at the State Department had to inquire whether Hale’s reports were reliable as well.41 While he did ask questions of many different perspectives
including members of Huerta’s Cabinet, he failed to mention the people he asked by name.42 While Hale’s major memorandum on Lane Wilson and Huerta came after the President made his decision on recognition, it was an influence on the Presidents decision to recall Lane Wilson.43
It is important to understand what President Wilson was reading from Hale who he considered a trustworthy source. Because what he reveals in the following report was very influential to the President’s decisions. According to Hale’s report to President Wilson of June 18th 1913, Madero had been losing popularity by February of the same year. Although he had been elected in what Hale calls, “the most fairly conducted election ever held in Mexico,” only ten percent of the populace had voted. When Madero’s promises of social and agrarian reform didn’t come fast enough his allies left him and soon the President turned to suppression as a method of maintaining control. Hale’s report goes on to say that by the end of Madero’s first year, parts of Mexico were still uncontrolled, there was no money in the coffers, and corruption was as rampant as before. To Hale these were the seeds of a popular rebellion. But instead, Hale explains that foreigners and exiles financed a military officer conspiracy and not a popular revolution, which erupted on February 8-9.44
Hale relayed that in his investigations he found that General Victoriano Huerta was regarded with disapproval. But shortly after the revolt had started, Madero and Huerta met and Huerta was made Commander-in-Chief of Mexico City army. Hale explained that the rebels were pinned down in an armory by Huerta’s soldiers in Mexico City and had little popular support from the city dwellers.
Yet, Lane Wilson told his guests, “that the Government had practically fallen,” and also asked Washington, “for powers to force the combatants to negotiations,” Hale explained. Hale found that Ambassador Wilson publicly admonished Madero, and later told the Associated Press that he thought Felix Diaz a rebel leader, “ought to rule Mexico.” Hale disclosed that the Ambassador even showed anger to Madero’s Family and those that were socially connected to him. Finally Ambassador Wilson declared that it was Madero’s fault that there was so much bloodshed.45
Continuing with his report Hale tells the story of US Consul-general in Mexico City Arnold Shanklin, who was assisting people in the Embassy court yard on the night of February 13-14. He was propositioned by a relative of General Huerta, who had asked if he could introduce him to the Ambassador. The man who later was revealed to be Enrique Zepeda, the illegitimate son of Huerta, explained that he had a message from Huerta. He went on to give details of a plan that would set Huerta and Diaz together and wanted to know if the Ambassador approved of such a move. Hale explained that this was an attempt by Diaz and Huerta to have an understanding with the Ambassador without involving him in anything incriminating. Shanklin shot back that he would have nothing to do with the plan but would introduce Zepeda.46 Hale reported that an understanding was made between Huerta and Ambassador Wilson via communications through the confidential messenger. 47
Hale writes that the British, Spanish, and German Empire’s ministers all agreed with Lane Wilson that the fighting was continuing because Madero had not surrendered. When questioning Lane Wilson, Hale found that he admitted to only consulting the Spanish, British and Germans because they were the largest interests. After telling Madero that they opposed his continuance of the hostilities, Lane Wilson and the British Minister visited the armory where the rebels lay trapped. Hale explains that by this time Lane Wilson had “reached the point where he admonished the legal government as if it were the revolt, and treated the mutineers as if they were the Government de jure and de facto.”
Lane Wilson met on February 15, with the Spanish, British and German ministers, where they decided unanimously that Madero must step down. The Spanish minister then visited the National Palace and told Madero of their opinion. But Hale reports that he told the Spanish Minister that “he did not recognize the right of diplomatists accredited to a nation to interfere in its domestic affair.” “He added that he might be killed, but would not resign.48
An armistice was reached, with the help of Lane Wilson, for the purpose of burying the dead. Hale reported that Huerta was in secret communication with Lane Wilson where an understanding had been come to about a coup d'état. Lane Wilson’s message to Secretary Knox said, “Huerta has sent his messenger to say that I may expect some action which will remove Madero from power at any moment, and that plans were fully matured.” Lane Wilson explained that he didn’t ask questions but wished that “no lives would be taken—except by due process.”49
February 18th 1913 saw the arrest of Francisco Madero. Huerta’s messenger, Zepeda personally came to the Embassy to tell Lane Wilson that he had just participated in the arrest and that it was successful.50 Upon hearing the message of Madero’s arrest the Ambassador sent a message to Diaz at the Armory to give him notice that the President had been removed from power. He invited Diaz and Huerta to meet at the Embassy. For three hours the three men and the Ambassador’s interpreter met to frame the new Government. Both Diaz and Huerta wanted to be president but without Huerta’s betrayal it wouldn’t have been a victory. Hale wrote that three times the angry men almost parted without finishing an agreement. But finally with Lane Wilson’s mediation a compromise was made. Huerta would be the Provisional President while an election would be called and Huerta was to support Diaz as the next president. After working out a Huerta’s cabinet, Lane Wilson asked the Huerta to release Madero’s cabinet but failed to concern himself with the welfare of Madero or Suárez.51
On February 19, the day after Madero’s arrest, he resigned saying that
he had to protect his family’s lives. Hale told President Wilson that arrangements were made to hold the resignation news until after the President and Vice-President were safely in another country, but they ended up directly in the hands of the men’s enemies. Hale explains that Lane Wilson refused to give asylum to the men but recommended that they be moved from the palace to the penitentiary.52
Hale wrote to President Wilson that Huerta took office on February 20. Lane Wilson sent a telegram telling Secretary Knox that he was going to recognize his presidency, also telling all consuls to cooperate because the new government would be recognized by all nations that day.53 Of course Knox had refused this suggestion. Lane Wilson even goes as far as lying about how much control of the country Huerta had in his reports to the State Department. But Hale portrays the situation much direr, saying that “the moment of Huerta’s ascension the country began to fall rapidly under the sway of rebellion.” Hale explained that Huerta had a grip on less then half the nation as of June 18, the time he wrote the letter.54
According to Hale, on February 22, Lane Wilson had met with the leaders of the new Huerta government at the Embassy, meeting with Huerta privately. Later that day and at the prison where Madero sat, a Colonel Luis Vallestores took command reliving the warden. Then around midnight that night Madero and his vice-president Piño Suárez were murdered. The official reports said that the two men were attempting to escape while being transferred from the palace to the prison.55
Lane Wilson gloated on many occasions to Hale about his predictions that Madero would fall. Hale asked him if “presiding at a conference of two revolting generals and in helping arrange the details of a new presidency,” was “proper diplomatic attitude,” Lane Wilson responded that the elimination of Madero was in the best interests for Mexico. Ambassador Wilson believed that Madero and Suárez were private citizens when they were killed and that he had no position to request an investigation into their deaths.56 Hale reports to President Wilson that Ambassador Wilson believed his actions were patriotic and was very surprised that so many didn’t agree with his support for the revolution.57
In his final thoughts of the letter of June 18, Hale believed that Lane Wilson was not a “malicious plotter.” But that without his assurances and support to the Rebels and Huerta the revolution would have never been successful. Hale believed that Ambassador Wilson could have ended the violence by a stern admonishment from the Embassy. Hale believes that Madero was not arrested and assassinated by his army officers until after the Ambassador had put forward no objections to the violence. Without Lane Wilson’s assurances that the US would quickly recognize the new regime the plans for a military dictatorship would never have been assembled.58
At that time many Mexicans believed that the actions of the Huerta regime were sanctioned by the US and so blamed the new surge of unlawfulness on the America. Once, Woodrow Wilson read Hale’s report he could only think that Lane Wilson needed to be let go, and that Huerta was the enemy of the people of Mexico and the US. Hale’s letter led the President to make the decision to bring Ambassador Wilson home. But before President Wilson had read the Hale letter he had made up his mind to not recognize Huerta. As mentioned before he had received many letters trying to encourage him to quickly recognize the New Mexican regime. One in particular almost made him abandon his moral ideology.
Julius Kruttschnitt of the Southern Pacific Company had Judge James Haff who specialized in American mining and railway companies before Mexican courts, write a letter to the President on May 12, 1913.59 In the letter Haff suggested that the US push the Mexican government to hold a democratic election for president sooner then the October 26 which had been set by the Mexican Congress. Kruttschnitt’s views represented the Phelps Dodge Corporation, Greene Cananea Copper Company, and Edward Doheny’s Mexican Petroleum Company. In other words the “Big Interests.”60
Kruttschnitt himself was chairmen of the board of Southern Pacific, a railroad company with Millions of dollars invested in over a thousand miles of Mexican Railroads. The company also had many American employees in Mexico who were in danger because of the ensuing violence. The early election, Kruttschnitt thought, would put an end to the carnage and give him back two of his rail lines that had been taken control of and damaged by Northern Mexican State Authorities who opposed Huerta.61 These wealthy industrialists’ ideas and motivations were opposite to many of President Wilson’s but they were very influential. Especially because Haff came to discuss the letter himself with the President’s good friend Cleveland H.Dodge. This visit by Haff and Dodge, made Woodrow Wilson consider the “temporary recognition of Huerta on condition that a fair election be held.”62
On May 15 a draft of instructions to be given to Ambassador Wilson was put together. Wilson was at that time ready to recognize Huerta on conditions similar to those set in the Haff Memorandum. The gist of the confidential orders began “Please represent to Huerta that our understanding was that he was to seek an early constitutional settlement of affairs in Mexico…” The letter which was never sent explains that that the delay in US recognition was due to the apparent doubt and uncertainty as to what Huerta’s strategy and goals really were. Stipulations would be made for a Ceasefire and early elections then the proposed October 26. Huerta was to promise that he secured a free and fair election. If this was done the US would also secure the same understanding with the states who opposed Huerta’s rule in the North.63
By this time Huerta had already been recognized by many of the European and Latin American Governments and had become bolder. He even announced his thoughts of refusing recognition of Lane Wilson as the American Ambassador. How could he be trusted to comply with any agreements that he made if President Wilson were to extend American recognition.64
After deciding not to send the final letter it was the time that Hale’s reports blasting Lane Wilson and Huerta were arriving.65 But before his report of June 18 even arrived the President made his decision. Instructions were sent to Ambassador Wilson on June 14, explaining that the US did not trust Huerta’s leadership was “moving towards conditions of settled peace, authority and justice.” Wilson stated that he was waiting for “satisfactory proof” of Huerta’s aims. He further offers to help with an armistice if only Huerta would pledge to hold early and fair elections. But this message wasn’t to be given to Huerta but to be taken as guidelines for Lane Wilson.66
But Lane Wilson didn’t change his attitude and continued to press for recognition. The bottom line was hit when President Wilson read Hales report that the Ambassador was having Huerta eat dinner in the Embassy. President Wilson finally told Bryan that he thought Lane Wilson should be recalled.67 If Lane Wilson had done his job and accepted the change in foreign policy ideology he might have done more for the interests he was trying hard to protect. But because he continually overstepped his authority and intentionally deceived Washington D.C. he became president Wilson’s greatest obstacle in making the decision of recognizing the Huerta regime.

Endnotes
1Peter N. Carroll and David A. Horowitz, On the Edge: The United States in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Thompson Wadsworth, 2005), 79.
2Larry D Hill, Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson’s Executive Agents in Mexico (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 3.
3Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters: President 1913-14 (New York: Greenwood, 1968), 55, quoting E.G. Conklin.
4Baker, 55-6.5Carroll, 79.
6Ibid., 86.
7Ibid.
8Baker, 237.
9Carrol, 86.
10Baker, 237.
11David Lawrence, The true Story of Woodrow Wilson. , 97, quoted in Baker, 238.
12Woodrow Wilson to A.A. Adee, March 25, 1913, quoted in Baker, 238.
13Ibid., 238.
14H.L. Wilson to Secretary of State, January 7, 1913; see also Ambassador Wilson’s January 14, 1913; January 17, 1913; January 18, 1913; January 20, 1913, quoted in Haley, P. Edward, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917. (Cambridge: MIT Press,1970), 55.
15Knox to American Embassy, Mexico, January 21, 1913, 812.00/5823; quoted in Haley, 55.
16H.L. Wilson to Secretary of State, January 22, 1913, 812.00/5916; quoted in Haley, 55.
17H.L. Wilson to Secretary of State, January 24, 1913, 812.005916; quoted in Haley, 56.
18See for example , Guyant (Ensenada) to Secretary of State, January 23, 1913, 812.00/5924; Lespina (Frontera) to Secretary of State, January 10, 1913, 812.00/5925; Edwards (Acapulco) to Secretary of State, January 23, 1913, 812.00/5926; Hamm (Durango) to Secretary of State, January 30, 1913, 812.00/5930; Bowman (Nogales) to Secretary of State, January 25, 1913, 812.005941; Canada (Tampico) to Secretary of State, January 26, 1913, 812.00/5942; Kirk (Manzanillo) to Secretary of State, January
16, 1913, 812.00/5945; Schmutz (Aguascalientes) to Secretary of State, January 20, 1913, 812.00/5946; Alger (Mazatlán) to Secretary of State, January 18, 1913 , 812.005947; quoted in Haley, 56.
19Dearing to Buck, January 27, 1913; quoted in Haley, 56.
20Knox to Taft, January 27, 1913, 812.00/7229A; quoted in Haley, 57.
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
23H.L. Wilson to Secretary of State, January 9, 1913, 5 p.m., 812.00/7229A; quoted in Haley, 57.
24H.L. Wilson to Secretary of State, January 18, 1913, 312.11/1048; quoted in Haley, 58.
25Confidential Series A, no. 87, Mexico, no. 13, September 17, 1912, 63; quoted in Haley, 44.
26Secretary of State to American Embassy , Mexico, September 16, 1912, Confidential Series A, no. 87, Mexico, no. 13, September 12, 1912, 124; quoted in Haley, 47.
27Foreign Relations, 1912, 843; quoted in Haley, 48.
28H.L. Wilson to Secretary of State, August 28, 1912, 812.00/4899; quoted in Haley, 45.
29H.L. Wilson to Secretary of State, September 7, 1912, 812.00/4902; quoted in Haley, 45.
30Haley, 44-6.
31Ibid., 59.
32Baker, 61.
33Newton D. Baker, address at Philadelphia, April 11, 1927; quoted in Baker, 64.
34Samuel G. Blythe, interview with Woodrow Wilson, Saturday Evening Post, 23 May 1914, from Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. III, 111; quoted in Baker.
35H.L. Wilson to Secretary of State, March 3, 1913, from Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, 753; quoted in Haley, 45.
36Woodrow Wilson’s Statement on Relations with Latin America, March 12, 1913, from Arthur S Link, ed. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 27; 1913 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 172-3.
37Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom, (Garden City: 1913), vii; quoted in Hill, 23.
38William Bayard Hale, “With the Know Mission to Central America,” The Worlds Work, XXIV (June, July, 1912), 179-93, 323-36; “our Danger in Central America,”ibid., XXIV (August, 1912), 443-51; quoted in Hill, 23.
39Ibid., 23.
40Hale did not reveal the sources of information for each report, but in scattered passages of his numerous dispatches he identified the above informants. See Hale to State Department, June 3, 18, July 12, 24, August 5, 1913, in NA 812.00/7798½, 23616, 23626, 23632, 23639; Hale to State Department, June 12, 1913, in Wilson Papers, Ser. 2, Box 94; Memorandum (by Hale), September 28, 1913, ibid., Box 97; quoted in Hill, 27.
41Long to Bryan, August 22, 1913, in NA 812.00/17669; quoted in Hill, 27.
42Hale to State Department, June 3, July 12, 24, August 5, 1913, ibid./23616, 23626, 23632, 23639; Hale to State Department, June 12,1913, in Wilson Papers, Ser. 2, Box94: Alberto Noél to Felix Díaz, June 30, 1913, enclosed in Henry Lane Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, July 1, 1913, ibid.; Memorandum (by Hale), September 28, 1913, ibid., Box 97; Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile (Garden City, N. Y., 1927), 305-6. Alberto Noél, Felix Díaz ‘s private secretary, reported his interview with Hale to his employer, who passed the letter on to Ambassador Wilson. Noél’s letter continued a highly critical characterization of Hale, which the ambassador sought to use to discredit the special agent.
43Woodrow Wilson to W. J. Bryan, July 1, 1913; quoted in Baker, 255.
44William Bayard Hale to Woodrow Wilson, June 18, 1913; quoted in Link, 536-7
45Ibid., 538-40.
46Ibid., 541and 543.
47Ibid., 541-2.
47Ibid., 540.
49Ibid., 542.
50Ibid., 543-4.
51Ibid., 545.
52Ibid., 546.
53Ibid., 547.
54Ibid., 548.
55Ibid., 548.
56Ibid., 550.
57Ibid., 551.
58Ibid., 552.
59Delbert James Haff to Woodrow Wilson, May 12, 1913; quoted in Link, 419-425. and Baker, 245.
60Baker, 245-6.
61Julius Kruttschnitt to William Jennings Bryan, May 26, 1913; quoted in Link, 479-480.
62Baker, 247.
63[Woodrow Wilson] Draft Instructions for H. L. Wilson, May 15, 1913; quoted in Link, 435-6. and Baker, 248-9. The matter of the note not being sent appears on Baker, 253.
64Baker, 249.66
65Baker, 253.
66Woodrow Wilson to H.L. Wilson, June 14, 1913; quoted in Link, 518.
67H. L. Wilson to Secretary of State, June 29, 1913; quoted in Baker, 255.

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